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Unitary Taxation: Tax Base and the Role of Accounting 
 
Prem Sikka and Richard Murphy 
 
  
Summary 
 
For more than twenty years there have been discussions on the issue of multinational 
corporations shifting profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions, with resulting gains to them from 
the resulting reduction in their effective tax rate. Underpinning much of this debate has been an 
implicit assumption that, first of all, profits are a fixed and constant known factor in this tax base-
shifting equation; and, secondly, that by adopting consistent international financial reporting 
standards (IFRSs) the risk of arbitraging on tax is removed from this equation. Arguments for 
unitary taxation have particularly advanced this assumption.  
 
We seek to show that the relationship between tax and financial reporting is now remote, and 
that no jurisdiction that we can identify relies upon unadjusted traditional accounting profit as a 
basis for the taxation of corporate income. This paper argues that this problem would, if 
anything, increase with dependence upon IFRSs, which serve entirely different purposes. IFRSs 
contain many subjective elements within their concepts of income and expenses, to provide the 
certainty that tax reporting requires. We draw instead upon the thinking underpinning the 
European Union’s (EU’s) Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), to suggest that 
tax-specific measures of income and expenses for taxation purposes need to be defined. Such 
a transactional approach provides a potential basis for developing unitary taxation and 
determining a taxation base that could then be apportioned to each jurisdiction. However, in the 
practical political context the EU needs to be sensitive to the interests of member states, which 
have an interest in adopting particular ways of dealing with deductibility of interest, royalty 
payments and allowances for capital expenditure. In order to secure political momentum for 
change, we suggest that for the time being such contentious matters be deferred by allowing 
relief on these items to be granted at a national level after apportionment of other income 
between participating states in a regional unitary tax system. The paper then makes some 
suggestions for the development of a conceptual framework for taxation accounting standards 
that could be used to address these issues. 
 
Keywords: tax avoidance; accounting; transfer pricing; accounting standards; unitary taxation. 
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Introduction 
 
The corporate tax system is in crisis, as intensification of economic globalisation has enabled 
corporations to shift their profits to low-/no-tax jurisdictions and to avoid paying taxes in 
countries where most of their sales, assets and employees are located (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2013; UK House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). Nation states have responded 
to the erosion of their tax base in a variety of contradictory ways. For example, the UK 
corporation tax rate has declined from 52 per cent in 1982 to 21 per cent in 2014, and is 
scheduled to fall to 20 per cent in 2015. However, this has neither stemmed corporate tax 
avoidance nor checked the ingenuity of the tax avoidance industry to craft new schemes 
(Mitchell and Sikka 2011). Not surprisingly, the erosion of tax base and profit shifting is on 
the international political agenda. Consequently the 2013 communiqué issued by the G8 
leaders states that: ‘We agree to work together to address base erosion and profit shifting 
and to ensure that international and our own tax rules do not allow or encourage any 
multinational enterprises to reduce overall taxes paid by artificially shifting profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions’.1  
 
Corporate taxes are supposedly levied on profits, although as we show below they are 
almost invariably actually assessed on chargeable income less tax-allowable expenses, with 
both figures representing data abstracted from accounts. Hence any attempt to address profit 
shifting needs to pay attention to the role of accounting. Historically profit or loss as shown by 
the annual financial accounts has been the starting point for the computation of taxable 
profits. However, for a considerable period taxation and accounting practices have followed 
divergent trajectories (Green 1995; Whittington 1995), resulting in complexity, uncertainty 
and leakage of tax revenue (Sikka and Willmott 2010; European Commission 2001). The 
conventional accounting definition of assets, liabilities, income and expenses do not seem to 
be able to prevent corporations from creating intangible assets, management fees and 
royalty programmes that shift profits to low-/no-tax jurisdictions and avoid taxes.2 
Commentators have noted that spurious intragroup transactions ‘can reduce or even 
eliminate profits in one place at a stroke of an accountant’s pen’ (ActionAid 2012: 8), and 
‘transfer pricing is the leading edge of what is wrong with international taxation’ (Sheppard 
2012). A United Nations Committee noted ‘certain transfer pricing practices (i.e. “mispricing”) 
result in base erosion and profit shifting. These practices are particularly prevalent in relation 
to multinational profits generated by brands, intellectual property or digital services that are 
highly mobile and can be located anywhere in the world’ (United Nations Finance for 
Development 2014: 2). 
 
Efforts to check erosion of tax base and shifting of profits have resulted in two broad 
proposals for reform. The first approach, advanced by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), is the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project 
that advocates ad hoc reforms to the current system for taxing corporate profits (OECD 
2013a, 2013b, 2013c). The second approach, unitary taxation, calls for a fundamental reform 
of the way international corporate tax liabilities are calculated. An example of this approach is 
the CCCTB, a system for taxing transnational corporations advocated by the EU (European 
Commission 2001, 2003a, 2011). The key idea in unitary taxation is to eliminate all 
intragroup transactions and to treat the profits of a group of companies, whether as a whole 
or for a defined territorial area, as the tax base. These profits can then be apportioned to 
each jurisdiction according to a formula and be taxed by the relevant state (Picciotto 1992; 
                                                 
1  Available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207771/Lough_Erne_2013_G8_Leaders
_Communique.pdf> accessed 15 June 2014. 
2  In re: WorldCom Inc. et al. (2004) United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York: Third and Final Report 
of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, Washington DC. 
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Weiner 2005; Clausing and Avi-Yonah 2007; Avi-Yonah et al. 2009). As unitary taxation 
holds out the prospect of limiting the possibility of profit shifting and the accompanying 
erosion of the tax base, the relationship between it and the role of accounting has to be 
considered. This is because in any unitary taxation system tax will still be levied on corporate 
profits, but which profits are to be taxed and how are they to be calculated remains an issue 
of contention.  
 
In the face of uncertainty, some have assumed that the spread of international accounting 
standards (IASs) might produce a single unambiguous set of accounting numbers that can 
then be used for tax purposes. For example, Picciotto claims that: ‘Harmonisation of the tax 
base could be facilitated since many countries accept accounts for tax purposes based on 
corporate accounting principles, for which international standards now exist’ (Picciotto 2012: 
11). The difficulty with such a position is that, even if a uniform reading of accounting rules 
were possible, it would not change the highly subjective nature of accounting and companies 
would have considerable flexibility in recognising income, assets, liability, expenses, profits 
and losses (Smith 1996; Clarke et al. 2003). This is antithetical to principles of taxation, 
which require certainty. This paper addresses five issues that are central to determining the 
suitability of accounting practices to be a basis for the proposed taxation reforms (unitary 
taxation and OECD proposals). On the basis of its analysis, the paper offers some tentative 
solutions. The issues are: 
 
1. How far do financial accounts (including a profit and loss statement), which could be 
prepared under a variety of accounting methods and standards, provide an adequate 
basis for a combined report with consolidated accounts for assessing corporate groups 
for tax? 
2. How suitable are IFRSs as a basis for tax accounts, especially for developing countries? 
3. To what extent do the tax base definitions in the CCCTB provide a suitable model for 
international adoption, and how do they compare with US tax reporting standards as 
used for state formulary apportionment? 
4. What would be the most suitable, practical and effective standards to use when 
assessing a transnational corporation under a profit split or unitary taxation approach, 
especially for developing countries?  
5. What appropriate recommendations could be made for the development of more 
integrated international tax accounting standards? 
 
This paper is organised into five sections. Section 1 outlines the current OECD position and 
its shortcomings. In this context it is necessary to outline the tensions between accounting for 
taxation and financial reporting practices, and why mere tweaking of tax rules cannot 
overcome the way in which accounting issues have contributed to base erosion and profit 
shifting. Section 2 considers the possibility of using accounting data prepared in accordance 
with existing financial reporting standards for taxation purposes. This section notes that there 
is considerable tension between accounting numbers used in financial reports and 
calculation of corporate tax liabilities. It argues that IFRSs are unlikely to provide a suitable 
basis for the determination of a tax base. How might this tension be addressed? It is helpful 
to reflect on the practices of jurisdictions that have a measure of unitary taxation, and those 
which aspire to adopt unitary taxation. The US has a system of unitary taxation within its 
federal system, and the EU has been developing a proposal for a CCCTB, a variant of 
unitary taxation. Therefore Section 3 undertakes a comparison of the EU and US approaches 
to using financial accounting numbers for unitary taxation, focusing in particular on the 
CCCTB framework. Section 4 extends the debate to developing countries, as they have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the current way of taxing multinational corporations and many 
civil society organisations have expressed a preference for unitary taxation (Jansky and 
Prats 2013; ActionAid 2014). This section briefly reports on the practices of 153 jurisdictions 
to see how the interface between accounting and taxation is managed, and the kind of 
tensions that arise. This encourages reflection on whether the US and EU perspectives on 
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unitary taxation have some relevance for developing countries. Section 5 concludes the 
paper, drawing together the evidence presented in previous sections and offering 
suggestions for overcoming some of the problems encountered in using accounting numbers 
to develop a tax base for unitary taxation.  
 
 
1  Accounting and taxation: the OECD 
approach  
 
In the era of economic globalisation, the current approach towards taxation of the profits of 
multinational companies is highly problematic. There is some recognition of this in the BEPS 
project launched by OECD. A major problem is that multinational companies under common 
control and direction operate through a web of subsidiaries to shift profits yet appear to be 
compliant with OECD rules. The OECD model for international taxation is based on what is 
commonly described as the ‘separate entity’ assumption, that the many subsidiaries of a 
parent company are independent. In this scenario, arm’s length or independent market prices 
are assumed to be available so that they can be used to allocate profits to each country 
(OECD 2009, 2010). This approach does not recognise that market participants are linked 
because they are part of an integrated group. The OECD position has been extensively 
critiqued (e.g. Avi-Yonah and Benshalom 2010; Durst 2011; US House of Representatives 
Committee on Ways and Means 2010), but remains largely unresolved in tax laws and 
practices. This gives companies an opportunity to arbitrage the world’s tax systems, and shift 
profits to favourable jurisdictions. 
  
The problem of profit/loss on intragroup transactions is also encountered by financial 
reporting practices. The legislators and accounting rulemakers have addressed it through the 
concept of group consolidated accounts (IASB 2012b). In consolidated accounts subsidiaries 
under common control are treated as part of a single unified group of companies. Such 
accounts are underpinned by the understanding that there can be no profit or loss until an 
entity undertakes a monetary transaction with a third party. Only then is any value added. It 
is not added by paper transactions between subsidiaries. Consolidated accounts do then 
represent the results of an entity that does not exist, in the sense that no single legal entity 
undertakes the transactions that they disclose. Instead consolidated accounts aim to 
represent the economic substance of the transactions that the group of companies under 
common control undertakes with third parties, and its outstanding assets and liabilities with 
those parties. Hence this form of accounting eliminates two significant issues that are highly 
relevant for tax practices and unitary taxation.  
 
Firstly, upon consolidation the impact of intragroup transactions between companies under 
common control is eliminated. Both sides of any transaction, whether impacting upon the 
income statement (profit and loss account) or statement of financial affairs (balance sheet), 
have to be removed to provide the essential quality of balanced accounts. It is often 
presumed that this eliminates the effects of profit shifting on the reported profits of the group 
as a whole. This is, however, very largely the consequence of the second adjustment made, 
the requirement that the underlying accounts of the separate group entities should be 
restated on the basis of one common set of accounting standards. It is this second approach 
that has at least as much impact on the removal of opportunity for profit shifting, because it 
ensures that the opportunity for arbitraging different accounting standards for temporary or 
permanent gain is eliminated. We stress that these two processes cannot be considered as 
independent of each other: the integrity of group accounts is dependent upon both taking 
place. 
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The concept of unitary taxation is in some respects akin to consolidated accounting. It 
considers multinational corporations to be engaged in:  
 
 a unified business as a single entity, requiring it to submit a single set of worldwide 
consolidated accounts in each country where it has a business presence, then 
apportioning the overall global profit to the various countries according to a weighted 
formula reflecting its genuine economic presence in each country. Each country 
involved sees the combined report and can then tax its portion of the global profits at 
its own rate. 
(Picciotto 2012: 1)  
 
Evidently, the issue of definition of the tax base – the standards to be specified for the 
consolidated accounts of the corporate group for tax purposes – is a central question for any 
unitary taxation system. In addressing this question the first important aspect is the 
relationship between accounting for financial and for taxation purposes, and it is to this that 
we now turn.  
 
 
2  Accounting and unitary taxation 
 
Central to all arguments for unitary taxation is the assumption that intragroup transactions do 
not generate profit, and that no economic value is added until a transaction with an 
independent third party takes place. This is also the basis for consolidated accounting, and 
since this is required of all companies quoted on the world’s major stock exchanges it is 
something with which the financial and accounting communities have become entirely 
familiar. 
 
Since consolidated group accounting is now the normal arrangement for most multinational 
group entities, it might seem that their accounts prepared on this method could form the 
basis for tax assessment under a unitary taxation system. It would certainly be advantageous 
if accounting and taxation practices were so closely aligned that accounting numbers could 
furnish a meaningful tax base. However, as we show in Section 4, this alignment does not 
exist in any major country. Indeed the differences are such that, to provide a basis for unitary 
taxation, revenue and expenses need to be (re)defined for tax purposes so that a common 
tax base can be determined. The challenges associated with this are explored in the 
remainder of this paper. 
 
2.1 Using financial accounting as a tax base 
 
The starting point for company reporting for both financial and tax purposes is its accounting 
books and records, and, since separate records are not normally expected to be kept for the 
two purposes, tax calculations begin with accounting profit/loss. Both accounting and 
taxation share vocabularies which focus on capital, income and profit, but there is 
considerable divergence in the meaning that both practices attach to these terms because of 
the different purposes of the calculations required. 
 
Accounting numbers may exude an aura of exactness and objectivity, but they are in practice 
a sedimented residue of negotiation and bargaining amongst economic and political interests 
in a dynamic social environment. Thus companies can choose almost any rate of 
depreciation for their fixed assets; research and development expenditure can be capitalised 
or expensed on the basis of arbitrary assumptions (Hope and Gray 1982; FRC 1989); and 
under certain circumstances even interest payments can be capitalised – not treated as an 
expense (Smith 1996). Accounting numbers are the outcome of politics, negotiations and 
bargaining amongst elites, professional judgments and sectoral practices rather than any 
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rigid interpretation of the law. It is the sufficiency of social consensus that gives accounting 
numbers the appearance of hardness, even when they are intellectually impure (Hines 
1988). Contemporary financial reporting is not designed to provide relevant or reliable bases 
for taxing corporate profits. In practice contemporary financial reporting is crafted primarily to 
respond to the assumed needs of shareholders and those buying and selling shares or other 
financial instruments in capital markets. Thus, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) states that the primary objective of financial reporting is: 
 
to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and 
potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions about providing 
resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling, or holding equity and 
debt instruments and providing or settling loans and other forms of credit. Decisions by 
existing and potential investors about buying, selling, or holding equity and debt 
instruments depend on the returns that they expect from an investment in those 
instruments; for example, dividends, principal and interest payments, or market price 
increases. Similarly, decisions by existing and potential lenders and other creditors 
about providing or settling loans and other forms of credit depend on the principal and 
interest payments or other returns that they expect. Investors’, lenders’, and other 
creditors’ expectations about returns depend on their assessment of the amount, 
timing, and uncertainty of (the prospects for) future net cash inflows to the entity. 
Consequently, existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors need 
information to help them assess the prospects for future net cash inflows to an entity. 
 (FASB 2010: 1-2) 
 
The focus on prediction of future cash flow depends on a range of revenue recognition and 
valuation concepts, such as fair value, market value, present values, deprival values and 
mark-to-model. This emphasis on reporting to capital markets means that profits and losses 
can be recognised simply because the market prices of assets and liabilities have fluctuated, 
irrespective of any actual sale. The actual or historical price of assets is not important in this 
model, and unrealised profits can be recognised in financial statements. This approach is 
central to the accounting and financial reporting standards set by both the FASB in the US 
and the IFRSs issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and is in 
marked contrast to the requirements of most tax authorities. Taxation is almost always levied 
on realised profits. At this most basic level the conflict between accounting for taxation 
purposes and financial reporting is already obvious. A second major reason for the 
divergence (as Section 4 shows) is that financial accounting approaches to defining key 
concepts such as depreciation, profits and capital are frequently considered to be too fuzzy 
for taxation purposes (Lamb 2002). Hence a more prescriptive approach is often adopted for 
taxation purposes – such as the common replacement of depreciation charges with a ‘capital 
allowance’ for taxation purposes.  
 
Behind both these types of divergence is the perspective or purpose of the measurement 
methods to be used. Thus in the US case of Thor Power Tool Company v Commissioner 439 
U.S. 522 (1979),3 the presiding judge said that:  
 
 The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to 
management, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major 
responsibility of the accountant is to protect these parties from being misled. The 
primary goal of the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable collection of 
revenue; the major responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the 
public fisc. Consistently with its goals and responsibilities, financial accounting has as 
its foundation the principle of conservatism, with its corollary that ‘possible errors in 
                                                 
3  Available at <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=439&invol=522>; and 
<http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/439/522/case.html> accessed 20 April 2014. 
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measurement [should] be in the direction of understatement rather than 
overstatement of net income and net assets’.  
 
Interestingly, accounting rulemakers have oscillated between retaining and abandoning the 
principle of conservatism (also known as prudence). Traditionally it requires businesses, 
such as banks, to set aside profits to meet likely bad loans or expected losses at the earliest 
opportunity. One of the consequences of this was that in good years banks set aside large 
amounts (known as provisions) of profits, and then in bad years wrote them back to the 
income statement. This facilitated profit smoothing, with the result that income statements did 
not show the performance for the year. The accounting rulemakers responded by requiring 
companies to recognise losses only when they were actually incurred, by promoting the 
incurred-loss rather than the expected-loss model. Of course banks developed practices for 
postponing recognition of bad debts. This maintained profits and performance-related 
executive pay, but banks soon accumulated a large volume of toxic debts. After the 2007-8 
banking crash, and following criticism by parliamentary committees (UK Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards 2013), the IASB restored a large measure of the principle 
of conservatism to financial reporting (IASB 2014). This episode is again illustrative of the 
political nature of financial accounting practices, and the resulting numbers cannot provide a 
tax base that needs to exhibit certainty. 
 
That said, an uneasy and complex relationship between financial accounting and taxation 
practices continues. For example, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs states that: 
‘the question of capital or revenue is a question of law not of accountancy. What matters is 
the effect of the expenditure in question. Accountancy does not determine that effect but may 
be informative as to what was the effect’ (HMRC n.d.).  
 
Regarding the key question of the relationship between capital and income, both tax and 
financial accounting generally recognise that profits can only arise after the capital of the 
enterprise is maintained or restored, but the practices used for this purpose can diverge and 
result in a variety of calculations from the same data (Hicks 1965; Sterling and Lemke 1982; 
Tweedie and Whittington 1984). The extant US accounting standards generally advocate the 
maintenance of financial (or money) capital, whilst the IFRSs allow businesses to select the 
maintenance of either financial or physical capital (IASB 2012a).4 Historically accounting 
standards have also used other methods, such as proprietary, entity and other capital 
maintenance concepts, to provide some relief for the erosion of the capital base by price-
level changes (Tweedie and Whittington 1984). One of the consequences of the impact of 
the politics of accounting is that it is now hard to discern any clear criterion of capital 
maintenance within current financial reporting, as financial statements are a mixture of 
historical costs, fair values, market values, net realisable and present values.  
 
In contrast taxation practices usually seek to deliver an element of certainty to the calculation 
of tax liabilities. This difference in objective is at the core of the difference between tax and 
financial accounting. Financial accounting has always been to some degree subjective, 
allowing, for example, what it has called a ‘true and fair override’, which permits rules to be 
waived if the outcome of their application would appear to lead to an unreasonable result. It 
also now permits, as the above brief analysis suggests, considerable choice in the approach 
any company may adopt to meet what it perceives to be the needs of the users of its 
financial statements. Tax has an altogether different objective, which has been consistency 
and predictability. This has meant that tax reporting tends to recognise realised income, 
primarily provides relief for expenditure on the basis of historical costs (sometime adjusted 
for price level changes), and is closer to the logic of the maintenance of financial (money) 
capital than any other capital maintenance principle. The reasoning is obvious: in a tax 
system capacity to pay is paramount, and so these principles matter most. They do, 
                                                 
4  See Appendix for an illustration. 
  
12 
however, conflict with much modern financial reporting. The result is that there is 
considerable divergence between the basis on which expenses, revenue and profits are 
recognised in corporate financial statements, and those allowed for tax purposes. 
 
2.2 Financial reporting and tax 
 
The divergence between accounting and taxation practices has accelerated as states have 
delegated standard-setting to private interest groups (e.g. the IASB and its successor the 
IFRS Foundation, and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK). In addition, the 
general trend towards prioritising the assumed needs of capital markets has made short-term 
considerations of maximising shareholder value central to accounting standard-setting, and 
further constrained the possibility of alignment between accounting and taxation prices 
(Lamb et al. 1998). Since the 1970s financial reporting has oscillated from preoccupation 
with reporting historical costs, market values and information about corporate stewardship, 
and something that would enable shareholders to make useful economic decisions. When 
the mid-1970s banking crash highlighted the failures of published company accounts, a 
report published by the UK accountancy rulemakers sought to soothe critics with claims that 
in future they would strive to serve almost all social constituencies, such as shareholders, 
providers of other capital such as loan financiers, employees, analysts, other business, the 
government including tax authorities (explicitly stated), and the public (Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee 1975). The report was never ratified by any professional accountancy 
body and did not deliver any of its promises. The current position, as expressed by the IASB, 
is that the general purpose of ‘financial reporting is to provide financial information about the 
reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in 
making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, 
selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or settling loans and other forms 
of credit’ (IASB 2013: 195). 
 
Contemporary financial reporting standards therefore, by design, do not give any explicit 
consideration to the interests of the state or broader society, and hence are not directly 
concerned with enabling the state to collect taxes. This does lead to doubt as to their 
suitability for this purpose in both developed and developing countries.  
 
2.3 The mirage of convergence of accounting standards 
 
Although there has been a general trend towards defining financial accounting standards 
aimed at the needs of financial markets, convergence is still in many ways slow and hesitant. 
Since January 2005 all companies listed on a recognised EU stock exchange have been 
required to prepare consolidated financial statements in accordance with the requirements of 
IFRSs. However, national traditions and ways of making sense of cultural practices are not 
easily displaced by the comparatively recent advent of accounting standards. Instead local 
application of these standards is subject to various forms of adoption, modification and 
recommendation; even then there remain a wide range of issues about translation of words 
and what concepts might mean in a particular cultural setting (Baskerville and Evans 2011) 
 
Despite the formal adoption of IFRSs by the EU there are, for example, material differences 
between German accounting practices and IFRSs. For example, IFRSs (IFRS 3, IAS 36, IAS 
38) require that goodwill appearing in the balance sheet is not to be amortised. Instead it is to 
be subjected to an annual impairment test. The resulting diminution, depending on 
circumstances, may be offset against revaluation reserve or can affect the income statement. 
In contrast the German accounting standard GAS4 requires that goodwill be amortised and 
the amounts appearing in the balance sheet are to be adjusted to reflect the changes in 
value (for this and further examples, see PwC 2010).  
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The problems are not confined to EU countries. In 2007 Japan signed an agreement with the 
IASB to accelerate convergence between Japanese accounting standards and IFRSs, but 
progress has been slow. From 1 January 2012 Japan has permitted selected multinational 
corporations to use IFRSs. Since the end of the Second World War much Japanese financial 
reporting has been influenced by US practices, and considerable differences with IFRSs 
remain (PwC 2012). 
 
In the US domestic companies are not permitted to use IFRSs, but foreign companies 
operating in the US can file statutory accounts prepared in accordance with IFRSs. Since 
subsidiaries of US corporations operating in Europe or elsewhere have to comply with local 
requirements, there can be considerable differences when reporting the same transactions in 
local accounts and in group consolidated financial statements. In addition, important and 
irreconcilable differences remain between US accounting standards and IFRSs. Perhaps 
most important are the different preferred inventory valuation methods, with the USA 
requiring last-in, first-out (LIFO) valuation (FASB 2005) and European countries requiring 
first-in, first-out (FIFO) valuation (FRC 1988; IASB 2005). The impact is considered in the 
Appendix. 
 
It is also important to note that even the harmonisation of global/regional accounting rules will 
not necessarily produce definitions acceptable for tax purposes. For example, financial 
reporting standards define an asset as a ‘resource controlled by the entity as a result of past 
events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity’; and a 
liability is defined as ‘a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the 
settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying 
economic benefits’ (IASB 2012a). Such a definition does not provide a way of distinguishing 
sham or artificial assets from the rest. The IASB definitions continue to treat each 
subsidiary/affiliate as an independent entity, and do not consider a corporation to be an 
integrated entity. For example, in the UK case of Iliffe News and Media Ltd & Ors v Revenue 
& Customs [2012] UKFTT 696 (TC), a company created new assets and newspaper 
mastheads and leased them to subsidiaries within the group for royalties. The result was to 
reduce reported profits of some subsidiaries. The subsidiary companies then sought to 
secure tax relief for payment of royalties paid to the parent company. The court considered 
the wording of relevant accounting standards and testimony of accounting experts, but felt 
that in the light of legal interpretations a valid asset had not been created, whether or not 
accounting recognised its existence.  
 
To sum up, there is a considerable body of evidence that disputes the claims of convergence 
of accounting standards or convergence between accounting and taxation practices. Some 
of the problems are captured in the following statement from the Indian tax authority: 
 
 It is our conscious decision not to accept IFRS system for tax purposes. And we are 
not alone here; most countries in the world have followed this approach. Even the US 
does not have IFRS for tax purposes ... Our system is not ready yet to accept the IFRS 
system as a recognised system for income-tax purposes ... When you switch over from 
a historical costing system to a market value system, you can assign valuations which 
can lead to significant under-reporting of profits. This could lead to under-reporting of 
corporate income ... frequent reassessment of assets and liabilities based on 
fluctuating market value would raise problems in taxation, which is based on the cost of 
purchasing the asset. The tax authorities have serious concerns over the sentiment-
driven volatility integral to fair valuation of assets and liabilities, which could lead to 
under-reporting of income.5 
                                                 
5  The Financial Express (2011) ‘IFRS system not conducive for taxation purposes, says Mitra’, 7 April 2011, 
<http://www.financialexpress.com/news/ifrs-system-not-conducive-for-taxation-purposes-says-mitra/772775/0> 
accessed 18 July 2013. 
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3  Accounting and EU proposals for a CCCTB 
 
The proposal being developed by the EU for a CCCTB seeks to harmonise the tax base on 
which each member state can levy taxes. It does not seek to harmonise tax rates. The focus 
on calculation of the tax base inevitably draws attention to accounting practices. 
 
The EU could have accepted the taxable profits or losses shown by IFRS-based accounts as 
the tax base for the CCCTB even if restricted to the relevant geographic territories covered 
by the EU, as compliance with IFRSs is mandatory for all EU-listed companies. However, 
this would have created a number of hurdles. Firstly, although there are a number of EU 
directives that provide a framework for both corporate law and accounting, there has never 
been any harmonisation of corporate tax laws because direct taxation is regarded as a 
matter for member states alone. Secondly, for reasons stated in the previous sections of this 
paper, conventional accounting definitions are not entirely suitable for tax purposes and 
IFRSs are not likely to provide a suitable base for any tax computation without significant 
adjustment. This presented a challenge for developing the CCCTB, and this section will 
examine the accounting issues experienced in the attempt by the EU to develop a framework 
for the CCCTB. 
 
3.1 CCCTB Mark 1 
 
The origins of the CCCTB lay in the Ruding Report (European Commission 1992), which 
considers that what were then called international accounting standards (IASs) can at least 
provide a good starting point for tax base definition. It says that: ‘The Committee believes 
that commercial accounts produced for financial reporting purposes should form the starting 
point for the computation of taxable income in all Member States. However, it draws attention 
to the fact that financial statements are not yet fully harmonised within the Community and 
even then would serve objectives other than tax’ (European Commission 1992: 37-38).  
 
In 2001, with a possible harmonisation of IASs on the horizon, the European Commission 
added that: ‘The increasing integration of financial markets and the creation of pan-European 
stock exchanges can be expected to accelerate accounting harmonisation even further. 
Although not directly related to taxation, this development may generally help the future 
development of a common corporate tax base and to some extent the IAS may serve as a 
useful point of reference’ (European Commission 2001: 18). 
 
In 2002 the EU enacted a Regulation to require companies listed on any European stock 
exchange to comply with the requirements of IASs with effect from 1 January 2005.6 This 
was followed in 2003 by a programme of rapid endorsement of extant IASs (Schon 2004). 
Amidst these developments the European Commission noted some of the difficulties in 
applying accounting rules for taxation purposes (European Commission 1992, 2003a), but a 
subsequent press release stated that: ‘The Commission suggests that if companies will be 
reporting profits according to a common standard then this common measure of profitability 
could be used as a starting point for a common EU tax base (i.e. a common definition of 
taxable profits)’ (European Commission 2003b).  
 
A 2006 paper by the European Commission reiterated the need to develop a CCCTB for their 
EU-wide corporate activities, but there is no mention of any use of accounting standards to 
provide a uniform tax base (European Commission 2006). The Commission seems to have 
                                                 
6  Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the Application of 
International Accounting Standards, 19 July 2002 (<http://www.iaasa.ie/legislation/ias_reg_1606_2002.pdf> accessed 
29 April 2014). 
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recognised some of the difficulties associated with using financial reporting standards for tax 
purposes (see above), and modified this approach to develop the CCCTB. 
 
3.2 CCCTB Mark 2 
 
In 2004 the Commission established a Working Group on the CCCTB to develop the 
technical aspects; this met until April 2008. It stated that: ‘Harmonisation will only involve the 
computation of the tax base and will not interfere with financial accounts. Therefore, Member 
States will maintain their national rules on financial accounting and the CCCTB system will 
introduce autonomous rules for computing the tax base of companies. These rules shall not 
affect the preparation of annual or consolidated accounts’ (European Commission 2011: 5).  
 
This suggests that the EU has followed a two-track development process. The first track 
continues to develop accounting standards for financial reporting, and the second is to 
develop a framework for accounting for tax purposes. No immediate convergence between 
accounting and taxation rules is envisaged, though the calculation of taxable profits will 
continue to some extent to be influenced by accounting practices.  
 
The Commission’s CCCTB proposal7 contained 136 Articles (reproduced in full in accessible 
format in KPMG 2011), and appears to be the beginning of a conceptual framework of 
accounting for taxation purposes (European Commission 2011). The basic principles were 
enshrined in Article 9, which stated that: 
 
In computing the tax base, profits and losses shall be recognised only when realised. 
Transactions and taxable events shall be measured individually. The calculation of the 
tax base shall be carried out in a consistent manner unless exceptional circumstances 
justify a change. The tax base shall be determined for each tax year unless otherwise 
provided. A tax year shall be any twelve-month period, unless otherwise provided. 
(European Commission 2011: 22) 
 
This Article seeks to provide the certainty that is the goal of most taxation systems, as noted 
previously. It also rejects many of the valuation bases used for reporting in IFRSs (and other 
standards, e.g. those set by the FASB). What is also notable is the focus upon the 
importance of individual transactions that form part of the calculation of taxable profit and 
loss. In contrast, IFRSs focus on valuation of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet, as 
their valuation is considered to be a good predictor of future cash flows that rational investors 
may be able to realise. In this schema the income statement is a by-product or a residue, 
reflecting in no small part movement in or fluctuation of market prices of assets and liabilities 
(Bromwich 2007). 
 
Care is, however, taken with the concept of profit in CCCTB Article 10, which states that: 
‘The tax base shall be calculated as revenues less exempt revenues, deductible expenses 
and other deductible items’. This Article does not use the term profit in defining the tax base. 
However, Article 1 defines profits as: ‘an excess of revenues over deductible expenses and 
other deductible items in a tax year’ (European Commission 2011: 22). 
 
Whilst accounting profit might be considered the overall change in net worth of an enterprise 
during a period, which as noted above might include realised and unrealised gains, this 
Article suggests instead, in combination with Article 9, that there is a residual surplus arising 
                                                 
7  We will mainly consider the Commission’s proposal as presented in March 2011 and approved with relatively minor 
amendments by a large majority by the Parliament in April 2012. Since that time it has been under technical 
examination by the European Council in a Working Group. A revised Compromise Proposal was issued by the Irish 
Presidency in May 2013 (Doc. 9180/13 FISC 80, mistakenly dated 2012), and another by the Lithuanian Presidency on 
1 October 2013 (14769/13 FISC 182), together with Explanatory Notes; we will consider some of these texts later. 
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from trading and other transactions (e.g. gains) that forms the tax base. This is a long way 
from the concept of profit as understood for financial reporting purposes. Instead the 
realisation principle is implicit, and the maintenance of financial capital is clearly implied by 
Articles 9 and 10. It is a residual surplus that is to be taxed, and not financial accounting 
profit. Furthermore it is clear that in calculating that residual surplus not all transactions stand 
equal. Article 12 elaborates that point and explains the principles associated with deductible 
expenses, whilst Article 14 deals with non-deductible expenses.8 The CCCTB represents a 
transaction-by-transaction basis quite different from that of financial accounting since it 
allows discrimination in deciding which items are deductible; this is a concept alien to 
financial reporting.  
 
This is also implicit in Chapter IX of the CCCTB, which explains the principles of 
consolidation that it uses. Article 59 says that: ‘In calculating the consolidated tax base, 
profits and losses arising from transactions directly carried out between members of a group 
shall be ignored’.  
 
Despite the superficial resemblance, the draft attaches a very different meaning to the term 
‘consolidated’ here to that usually used for accounting purposes. It does not mean that a 
single set of consolidated accounts covering all the members of a corporate group will be 
created for tax purposes, which is what financial accounting means by this term.9 Article 57 
on consolidation says: ‘The tax bases of the members of a group shall be consolidated’. 
 
However, as Article 1 notes: ‘“consolidated tax base” means the result of adding up the tax 
bases of all group members as calculated in accordance with Article 10’. This means that the 
accounts of each individual member of the consolidated group are first adjusted for tax in 
accordance with CCCTB rules, and only then are the resulting numbers added together. This 
stands in stark contrast to the approach of consolidating the entire financial statements of the 
various entities involved, and then adjusting the resulting consolidated profit in accordance 
with the rules of the CCCTB to produce a figure for the tax base for apportionment.  
 
Admittedly Article 59 states: ‘In calculating the consolidated tax base, profits and losses 
arising from transactions directly carried out between members of a group shall be ignored’. 
Nevertheless enormous difficulties remain which strain the relationship between this 
consolidation of profits and financial accounting, and there does not seem to have been any 
reconsideration of the approach adopted during the technical examination of the proposal by 
the EU Council.  
 
The first of the problems that arises is that there is no requirement that the financial 
statements of the various member companies whose results are consolidated need be 
prepared in accordance with the same accounting standards. Despite the adoption of IFRSs 
for listed companies, local standards vary from country to country across Europe as noted 
previously. They may, therefore, prepare their financial statements in accordance with local 
or permitted (as is the case for US-based companies operating in the EU) accounting 
standards. While for financial accounting consolidation purposes they must then be adjusted 
to an IFRS-consistent basis, crucially there seems to be no adjustment required in the 
CCCTB. It is simply stated in Article 57 that the tax bases shall be consolidated and, apart 
from the requirement that a single currency be used, no further adjustment process is 
required except for the statement in Article 59 that: ‘The method for recording intragroup 
                                                 
8  Both have been slightly amended for clarification in the Irish Presidency draft of 2013. 
9  Note also that the CCCTB covers only those companies resident within a participating EU member state, forming part of 
a corporate group that (crucially) chooses to become subject to the CCCTB. This means that those entities that are 
under common control but which are resident outside the EU will be left out of this consolidation. Normal international 
tax rules, including the arm’s length pricing method, will therefore still have to apply at the boundary of this 
consolidation.  
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transactions shall enable all intragroup transfers and sales to be identified at the lower of 
cost and value for tax purposes’. 
 
This means that in financial accounting terms there is no consolidation as such. For financial 
accounting consolidation means the production of a single set of financial statements 
covering all members of a group of companies. There is no attempt to do this in the CCCTB. 
Instead financial statements which may have been prepared in accordance with differing 
accounting standards are each separately adjusted in accordance with the CCCTB’s rules; 
these figures are then added up to produce what might at best be called an aggregated 
profit. 
 
This is a matter of significance. Firstly, because it does not require a consistent set of 
accounting standards to be applied across the group, the opportunity for tax arbitrage is not 
eliminated in the CCCTB: indeed, ample opportunity for it to be exploited appears inherent in 
the process. For example, profit may be shifted between periods within the same CCCTB 
group by arbitraging inventory valuation or revenue recognition rules within different 
accounting standards within one unitary taxation area. Such potential abuse could only be 
challenged under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) proposed in the CCCTB (Article 
80). As drafted in 2011 it simply reads as follows: ‘Artificial transactions carried out for the 
sole purpose of avoiding taxation shall be ignored for the purposes of calculating the tax 
base’. 
 
As redrafted in 2013 under the Irish Presidency it is substantially more comprehensive in 
scope and closer in its structure to current prevailing thinking on this issue, although still 
falling short of being as principles-based as might be desired.10 Suffice to say for our present 
purposes here that, due to deficiencies in its accounting approach, the effectiveness of the 
CCCTB will be heavily dependent on this GAAR provision.  
 
Also importantly, this accounting deficiency may affect the application of the apportionment 
formula put forward in Article 86 and the following sections. These propose a formula based 
equally on sales, employees (split 50:50 between payroll cost and employee numbers) and 
assets. However, without consistent accounting standards being applied across a group it is 
possible that all of these figures, bar perhaps employee numbers, may be calculated 
differently for the various entities under different accounting standards. This creates a risk of 
mis-statement and the opportunity for arbitraging formulas. A proper consolidation might 
overcome this other potential significant difficulty in the CCCTB. 
 
This calls into question the use of the word ‘consolidated’ in this context. Unitary taxation 
aims to adopt a different approach from that used under the separate entity principle, to 
which the OECD is dedicated in its approach to international taxation. Its starting point is a 
Combined Report covering all the related entities in the relevant corporate group. Under the 
CCCTB this includes only the entities resident in the EU member states participating in the 
system, and not all those in the corporate group. This is a significant limitation, since it 
excludes related entities in non-participating countries which may be used for base erosion 
and profit shifting, relying on the existing international tax rules based on the separate entity 
approach to deal with those. A further limitation, to which we have drawn attention in this 
section, is that the combined report of those related entities under the CCCTB does not 
require true consolidated accounts prepared under consistent accounting rules and then 
adjusted for tax purposes. Instead under the CCCTB the related entities would prepare 
separate accounts on accounting bases which may differ significantly; they would then have 
their individually-reported income adjusted for tax purposes in accordance with a common 
set of taxation rules, including the elimination of intragroup sales and expenses; and finally 
                                                 
10  There is no room here to discuss such shortcomings in greater detail. 
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the resulting tax-adjusted incomes would be aggregated to create a total for the related 
entities' taxable income. 
 
3.3 Comparison of the CCCTB’s accounting approach with the US state system 
 
As unitary taxation is operated within the domestic context of the US, where the states share 
common accounting and taxation rules, it is useful to examine the practices briefly. This 
examination may broaden understanding of the tensions and relationship between 
accounting and taxation in the US.  
 
A type of unitary taxation operates for US state taxes on corporate income, normally termed 
formulary apportionment. All states with a tax on corporate income use the company’s 
federal income tax return as the tax base for convenience, although it is not formally required 
(Siu et al. 2014). At the federal level US tax legislation states that:  
 
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary in order 
that the tax liability of any affiliated group of corporations making a consolidated return 
and of each corporation in the group, both during and after the period of affiliation, may 
be returned, determined, computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such manner 
as clearly to reflect the income-tax liability and the various factors necessary for the 
determination of such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of such tax liability. In 
carrying out the preceding sentence, the Secretary may prescribe rules that are 
different from the provisions of chapter 1 that would apply if such corporations filed 
separate returns. 
(26 USC § 1502 – Regulations11) 
 
Under the US system the taxpayer is required to provide the state tax authority with the 
taxpayer’s federal taxable income, which states the taxpayer’s nationwide income according 
to federal tax accounting principles. The taxpayer then, using forms provided by the state, 
must translate the federal income into state-specific tax accounting principles (typically by 
applying special tax incentives for, say, plant and equipment located in the particular state), 
and also must identify from the federal taxable income the income from those specific 
business activities of the taxpayer with respect to which the particular state has nexus under 
applicable US legal principles. Because of the requirement that states can reach only income 
from particular business activities of the taxpayer, the process of converting federal income 
into state apportionable income can be demanding and complex.  
 
The list of adjustments is lengthy and includes eliminating the consequence of intragroup 
trading and dividends. The key point for our purposes here is that the consolidated tax return 
is not necessarily aligned with the consolidated financial statements produced by the parent 
company for the benefit of its shareholders or capital markets. The return is based on the 
separate entity accounts for tax purposes of the individual entities, which are then re-
consolidated for tax purposes to create the combined consolidated federal income tax return. 
Hence unitary taxation in the US is not based on consolidated accounts as commonly 
understood by accountants. It is instead based on an aggregation of the type described 
previously for the CCCTB.  
 
One consequence of this divergence is that no entity may be included in the US federal 
consolidated income tax return unless it is 80 per cent owned and controlled by the parent 
entity (CCH 2013: 119). This rule conflicts with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) on this issue. In US GAAP (as in IFRSs) consolidation into group accounts is 
required of any entity which is under common control, but US GAAP diverges from IFRSs in 
                                                 
11  See <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/1502> accessed 18 December 2013.  
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its approach to control. It defines control in two ways, depending on how control of that entity 
is exercised (Ernst & Young 2011), but in both cases the approach is essentially that an 
investor controls an investee (and must therefore consolidate its accounts with its own) when 
the investor is exposed or has rights to variable returns from its involvement with the investee 
and has the ability to affect those returns through its power over the investee.12 What is 
unambiguously the case for the purposes of this paper is that such control is considered to 
exist when the investor has a much lower percentage of ownership than the 80 per cent 
required for US consolidation for tax purposes. Due to this broader definition, the 
consolidated financial accounts of a US corporation may well include entities that would and 
could not be included in its federal tax return, and which must be accounted for separately 
when it comes to the group’s tax affairs.  
 
The CCCTB also uses a test based on control for deciding which subsidiaries qualify for 
inclusion in the group, but the criteria in the Commission’s proposal differ from both IFRSs 
and the US federal tax rules. The proposed CCCTB Article 54 defines a qualifying subsidiary 
as an entity in which the parent company holds more than 50 per cent of the voting rights or 
more than 75 per cent of capital and right to profits. Hence while both the US tax rules and 
the EU’s proposed CCCTB depart from financial accounting rules for consolidation, they 
each adopt somewhat different criteria for the control test which determines when 
consolidation is required.  
 
Two conclusions follow. Firstly, the US state unitary tax system is based on separate entity 
accounts that are aggregated on bases inconsistent with US GAAP, but consistent with its 
federal tax laws. Secondly, the EU CCCTB replicates this approach and (as discussed in the 
previous section) provides tax accounting rules which are in many ways different from the 
logic underpinning IFRSs, although these are the required EU standards for the preparation 
of the consolidated financial accounts distributed to shareholders and capital markets.  
 
3.4 Issues for international unitary taxation 
 
This section briefly considers the implication of US practices and EU proposals for 
international taxation, as the adoption of unitary taxation may require regional and/or global 
agreements. 
 
It is clear that the approach adopted by both the EU and US for adjusting financial accounts 
to tax reporting standards would pose problems at the international level. Both these systems 
require this adjustment to be done first for the separate affiliates in each jurisdiction, and then 
aggregated for the whole corporate group. Both rely on a single set of tax accounting rules – 
in the US federal tax accounting regulations, and in the EU those being elaborated in the 
CCCTB; and both start from relatively homogenous financial accounting standards, the US 
GAAP, and IFRSs (although as we have seen there are still some significant national 
variations on these in the EU). This raises two questions relating to the transferability of this 
approach at the international level, and especially for developing countries.  
 
Firstly, worldwide agreement on a single set of tax accounting rules would clearly be very 
difficult or impossible. Without such rules tax authorities in each country would have to 
accept an aggregated return for the group based on tax returns prepared for its constituent 
entities in other countries. Even the verification of these returns would be very difficult, 
especially as many developing countries do not have tax information exchange agreements. 
The CCCTB (Article 109) proposes a procedure for submission of the group return by the 
principal taxpayer (i.e. the parent company within the EU) to the principal tax authority, but 
this also assumes close relations and cooperation between the tax authorities. More 
                                                 
12  This form of wording is based on IFRS 10 issued by the IASB, see <http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs10> 
accessed 29 March 2014. 
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seriously, starting from accounts prepared under different national tax accounting rules would 
make it very hard to assure any internal consistency. 
 
Secondly, whilst the US and to some extent the EU have some control of the accounting 
standards used within their domain, this is not true for many developing countries when the 
taxation of multinational corporations is considered. Local GAAP is within their control, but 
the GAAP that may be applied at a multinational level may not be. This creates the possibility 
that standards deemed inappropriate for use for tax purposes in other jurisdictions, such as 
IFRSs, might need to be used for unitary taxation purposes in developing countries, with the 
resulting reported data subjected to adjustments for taxation purposes.  
 
Developing countries have a key stake in international taxation. A frequent complaint is that 
the current system of corporate taxation deprives them of much-needed revenue, and non-
governmental organisations have argued that unitary taxation can address their concerns 
(ActionAid 2012, 2014). This inevitably raises questions about the role of traditional 
accounting in tax practices. What use do they make of accounting practices? Do they accept 
them for tax purposes? If not, how are they modified? Perhaps the difficulties of subjecting 
multinational companies to a unitary basis found in developed countries would also apply in 
developing jurisdictions. Therefore the next section briefly explores the relationship between 
financial accounting and tax reporting standards worldwide. 
 
 
4  Accounting, tax and developing countries  
 
There is, as has already been noted, a degree of dependence between financial and tax 
accounting, since financial accounting numbers are usually adjusted to arrive at taxable 
profits. To assess the impact of this process in both developed and developing countries, 
using each as a benchmark for the other, an analysis of data on corporate tax systems has 
been undertaken using PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) Worldwide Tax Summaries. This 
guide (PwC 2014) covers 153 states, allocating 15 pages to each on average. It is clearly 
intended for use by tax professionals and not the general public, but as a result it does 
provide a reasonably comprehensive analysis in technical language. Importantly, whilst it is 
not constructed as a database, it is apparent that the editors required the contribution for 
each jurisdiction to address a particular range of issues; as a consequence these are fairly 
uniformly addressed and in broadly consistent style, making it a suitable tool for analysis for 
this purpose. 
 
Of the 153 jurisdictions considered by PwC, one, the Caribbean Netherlands, had to be 
excluded from consideration for this survey’s purposes as it is at present in a state of political 
flux. That left 152 jurisdictions in the survey. Together they include more than 98.52 per cent 
of World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based upon World Bank data.13 Of these 152 
jurisdictions, 2 have no taxes on corporate profits (Bermuda and the Cayman Islands); 
Bahrain only charges these taxes on oil companies so has also been considered not to have 
a general corporate income tax. Excluding these left a sample base comprising 149 
jurisdictions covering 98.46 per cent of World GDP. The survey collected the following 
information: 
 
 Whether there was a tax on corporate income; 
 What the headline rate of tax was according to PwC; 
 Whether that tax was primarily charged on profits as per accounts or on chargeable 
income less allowable expenses (this suggestion, or formulations similar to it, being 
specifically sought in the text); 
                                                 
13  As per GDP estimates published by World Bank, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>. 
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 Whether accounts were specifically required to be submitted in support of the tax return; 
 Whether another tax base (e.g. based on turnover or turnover less fixed rate deductions) 
was available for assessment; 
 Whether a calendar year basis is imposed, potentially overruling an accounts basis; 
 Whether a residence basis of taxation on worldwide income is in use; 
 If a territorial basis for taxation has been adopted; 
 Whether a permanent establishment (PE) concept is in use; 
 Whether specific accounting overrides are in place and in particular: 
o Whether FIFO stock accounting is mandated; 
o Whether a capital allowance or similar system of standardised depreciation 
charges is in use in place of accounting depreciation; 
o Whether an interest cap is in place; 
o Whether thin capitalisation rules apply; 
o Whether transfer pricing rules are in operation; 
 Whether controlled foreign company rules are in operation, suggesting that the separate 
entity rule for taxation purposes has been overridden; 
 Whether the jurisdiction has transfer pricing rules; 
 If the jurisdiction has double tax agreements; 
 Whether a GAAR is in operation. 
 
It is stressed that such a survey is inevitably a perceptions index. It represents the state of 
play at a point in time. The opinion of at least 149 preparers of data is reflected in the PwC 
report, and additionally the perception of the researchers undertaking this survey is a factor 
in interpretation of the data presented by PwC. As such the survey is not definitive: in the 
time and with the resources available that was not possible. PwC may not have recorded a 
relevant issue, and equally we may have misinterpreted the report in some areas.  
 
The findings have been assessed for their relevance based on the jurisdiction’s: 
 
 Continent 
 GDP 
 Population 
 GDP per head 
 Ranking in the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index14 (FSI), where a rating of 
more than sixty was taken as indication of significant tax haven-style activity in a 
jurisdiction. 
 
World Bank data (see above) was used for the above analysis unless unavailable, such as 
for some UK Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories when CIA Factbook15 data has 
been used.  
 
The survey produced some clear results. As already noted, 149 of the 153 jurisdictions had a 
corporate income tax. Additionally, of those that had such a tax 112 (75.2 per cent) used a 
residence-based system charging worldwide income to tax, and 37 (24.8 per cent) a 
territorial-based system. Of the total sample 109 have a PE concept built into their tax 
system (73.2 per cent), including 22 of the 37 states using territorial taxation (59.5 per cent).  
 
These initial results indicate some of the issues that arise when considering the relationship 
between accounting and the tax base. Whilst a country using a residence-based tax system 
that does not have a PE concept in use (16.8 per cent of the sample, representing 25 
jurisdictions) might conceivably use accounting profit as the basis for determining the tax 
                                                 
14  See <http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/> for further information. 
15  Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. 
  
22 
liability of those entities that it considers resident in its jurisdiction, this cannot be said to be 
true of the remaining 124 countries for a number of reasons. 
 
Firstly, a country using a territorial tax system must by definition base its corporate tax 
charge on data extracted from accounts and not on accounting profit because the company 
may have overseas income. In that case partial data must be capable of use as the basis for 
tax assessment. Secondly, the same applies to a country using a residence-based system if 
a PE concept is in use, since this again means that tax must be charged on data extracted 
from accounts (to exclude a foreign PE), rather than on accounting profit as a whole. Thirdly, 
unadjusted accounting profit cannot be the basis for charge if it is explicitly stated not to be, 
or because other specific adjustments to accounting profit, such as a capital allowance 
system in place of accounting depreciation charges or an interest rate cap, are in operation.  
 
Examining the sample of twenty-five states with a residence concept but without a PE 
concept, in eight cases PwC reported them to have a corporation tax based on chargeable 
income less deductible expenses and not pure accounting profit. That leaves just seventeen 
jurisdictions that might plausibly solely or mainly use accounting profit as the main basis for 
charging this tax; but of these fifteen have a capital allowance regime in place of depreciation 
charges, and of the two remaining jurisdictions one has an interest cap in place. That leaves 
just one state, Puerto Rico, which is often used as a tax haven (although it is not considered 
as such by the Tax Justice Network’s FSI), which looks as though it may use something 
close to accounting profit as the basis for taxation – but even there rules to replace 
accounting depreciation charges with more standardised allowable rates are being 
introduced.  
 
Hence the immediate conclusion from the survey is that the link between accounting profit 
and tax exists, but is almost invariably not direct. In other words, however important 
accounting might be (and it is) there is compelling evidence that tax authorities do not rely 
solely on accounting data when charging companies to tax. As interesting as that conclusion 
might be in itself, it seemed appropriate to analyse the available data in a little more depth to 
see if any trends could be discerned. For this purpose the data was sorted by continent, 
whether the jurisdiction had high or low income, and if it was considered a financial secrecy 
jurisdiction, with the latter then also being sorted by high or low income. 
 
It was decided to categorise states by high or low income rather than whether they are 
developing or not. This was because an objective view could be taken on high and low 
income from the available data, whereas any developed/developing categorisation tends to 
be harder to quantify. The measure used to categorise states by their level of income was a 
simple one: high-income countries were those that had an average income above the 
median GDP per head in this sample, and low-income ones had an average income below 
the median GDP per head (the median GDP per head in the sample was US$8,124 per 
annum). 
 
Data by continent revealed surprisingly few trends of significance, and as such is not 
reproduced here. Data when analysed between high- and low-income jurisdictions, and then 
further analysed on the basis of whether the location was a financial secrecy jurisdiction, 
does adequately summarise many of the findings as follows (the figures in Table 1 represent 
the number of jurisdictions falling into each category): 
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Table 1  Accounting taxation across the world 
 
Country Lower-
income 
Higher-
income 
Total all 
jurisdictions 
Secrecy 
jurisdictions 
Higher-income 
secrecy 
jurisdictions 
Has CIT? 74 75 149 33 26 
Headline rate of CIT % (Ave) 23.98 24.98 - 21.68 19.74 
Based on profit? 18 29 47 10 9 
Based on income less 
expenses? 25 19 44 6 5 
Accounts required? 15 16 31 9 6 
Is another tax base also 
available? 27 10 37 5 2 
Calendar year basis 50 38 88 11 9 
Tax charged on worldwide 
income? 53 59 112 18 15 
Is a territorial basis used? 21 16 37 15 11 
Does the jurisdiction have a PE 
concept? 57 52 109 23 17 
Is the FIFO basis of stock 
valuation required? 42 54 96 19 17 
Is there a capital allowance 
system in place of accounting 
depreciation? 69 68 137 28 22 
Does the jurisdiction use an 
interest rate cap? 28 35 63 12 10 
Does the jurisdiction use transfer 
pricing rules? 57 49 106 15 9 
Does the jurisdiction use a thin 
capitalisation rule? 34 35 69 10 6 
Does the jurisdiction have a 
controlled foreign company 
regime? 6 23 29 1 1 
Does the jurisdiction have 
double tax agreements? 67 71 138 30 24 
Are withholding taxes applied to 
payments to non-residents? 74 65 139 26 19 
Is a GAAR in use? 6 10 16 5 5 
GDP per head above median = 1 
or below = 0 0 75 75 26 26 
FSI score 60 or over? 7 26 33 33 26 
 
The findings are that across the income spectrum there is considerable unwillingness to use 
of pure accounting data as the basis for corporate taxation assessments.  
 
That said, it is clear that there are some anti-avoidance measures that lower-income 
countries (often referred to as developing countries) do not have the capacity to operate. The 
more limited use of controlled foreign company legislation is an obvious example of this 
(although the almost total absence of this provision in secrecy jurisdictions, most of which are 
high-income jurisdictions, is perhaps as notable). 
 
The absence of general anti-avoidance rules is also telling: the power for tax authorities to 
totally override reported accounting arrangements that these rules permit seems hard for 
many jurisdictions to contemplate (but not so hard it seems for some secrecy jurisdictions, 
Jersey being a particularly notable example of a secrecy jurisdiction that has long used such 
an arrangement to defend its domestic tax base). However, when it comes to more obvious 
powers to adjust accounting data regimes, such as transfer pricing rules, lower-income 
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countries actually predominate in the sample, but that is partly explained by the prevalence 
of secrecy jurisdictions in the high-income category which have disdain for such provisions.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, more complex provisions such as interest rate caps are also widely 
found in lower-income countries. Tellingly, though, lower-income countries are also more 
inclined to provide alternative tax bases to those solely determined by profits, and to have a 
territorial basis for taxation. This may of course reflect the inability of many such jurisdictions 
to secure any meaningful data from beyond their own borders, despite the apparent 
availability of at least some double tax agreements. 
 
Most jurisdictions engage with the problems posed by discretion in accounting, for example 
by replacing depreciation charges with a capital allowance or equivalent arrangement, and in 
almost exactly equal numbers irrespective of income; whilst lower-income countries are less 
inclined to give direction on stock and inventory valuation bases, a majority do.  
 
These points being noted, it remains clear that the differences are much less striking than the 
similarities in this survey. It is clear that worldwide tax authorities appear united in their 
reluctance to rely upon accounting data, irrespective of the country’s level of income or, from 
the evidence of the regional surveys, almost irrespective of geographical location.  
 
This suggests a number of conclusions. The first is that the problems that accounting 
weaknesses create for tax authorities are not limited to higher-income jurisdictions: they are 
universal. Second, if there is a need to reform the accounting basis for taxation purposes 
then developing countries need to be involved in that debate, because they are as much 
impacted by this issue as any other country. Thirdly, whilst lower-income countries have 
shown a greater willingness to consider alternative accounting bases for assessing some 
companies, many of those alternative bases are targeted at smaller entities within their own 
jurisdiction. These include taxation on turnover or on turnover less fixed rate deductions 
determined by the industry sector in which the entity is engaged (a route now also being 
explored in the UK). This is not therefore an indication that they have found a solution to the 
problems of taxing multinational corporations. Lastly, in that case it is safe to assume that 
any problems in defining a tax base for assessing multinationals on a unitary basis found in 
developed countries would also apply in developing countries and lower-income jurisdictions.  
 
 
5  A new approach to tax base definition for 
unitary taxation  
 
The divergence between financial reporting and tax accounting standards is not just a 
practical or pragmatic matter. There are conceptual differences between accounting and 
taxation concepts of income, expenses, profits and losses, as well as in the related capital 
maintenance concepts to which each adheres. Since the 1970s the financial reporting 
practices have been primarily concerned about reporting the financial performance of an 
entity to capital markets (Cooper 2013). At one time accounting standards were consistent 
with the accruals concept that matched income and expenses as far as possible, and so 
broadly reflected the realisation principle usually found in tax accounting. It also meant that 
prudence (or conservatism) was paramount. This gave the profit and loss account priority in 
financial reporting. In contrast, current financial standards emphasise the importance of the 
balance sheet and its presentation of market values, reducing the income statement (or profit 
and loss account) to secondary status. This is contrary to the needs of taxation authorities. 
However, there is little chance of a change in the nature of accounting standards in the 
immediate future, as too much is invested in the current structures of reporting for significant 
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change to be likely. Hence there is a need for alternative thinking on the way in which reliable 
data can be produced for the assessment of corporation tax liabilities. 
 
As Section 3 shows, some of that thinking has been taking place in the formulation of the 
EU's CCCTB. This has laid a foundation for a conceptual framework for taxation accounting, 
for example by adopting the concept of realised profit as its basis, which essentially reverts 
to a historic cost accounting basis of reporting. This also makes clear that the concept of 
maintaining financial, or monetary, capital is inherent in this process, which few tax 
authorities would dispute. Tax liabilities are normally and necessarily determined on the 
basis of the taxpayer's ability to pay, which necessarily reduces most tax considerations to a 
cash basis. This is far removed from the jumbled and even confused valuation bases that are 
found in many current balance sheets, as noted in our discussion above. 
 
This is also true when it comes to the profit concept. In essence financial reporting considers 
a profit or loss to be the increase or fall in the capital value of an enterprise as shown by its 
balance sheet worth over a period, having taken out of account movements in equity and 
distribution of reserves. This makes profit or loss a residual of transactions of all sorts, with 
little qualitative differentiation. Tax necessarily must take a different approach, and the EU's 
CCCTB provides appropriate and clear indication of that. Transactions are necessarily 
considered on the basis of their specific type, and not as an amalgam as is the case in 
financial reporting. Each source of revenue has to be considered in its own right to assess 
whether it is subject to tax or not, and expenses may be offset only if allowed by the 
realisation principle, and only if that expense is explicitly permitted as a deduction for tax 
purposes. By definition, therefore, taxable income as defined in this way has a limited 
relationship with profit seen from the perspective of financial investors. Taxable income can 
be considered as a subset of all the transactions that may contribute to such profit, and the 
task of tax accounting is then seen as being the identification of the transactions within this 
subset that have a tax consequence and excluding all others. 
 
In essence this task of identifying the subset comprising those taxable revenues and 
allowable deductions is the essence of the tax adjustment process which translates profits 
reported for financial accounting purposes into the taxable income subject to a corporation 
tax charge. As Section 4 shows, although individual specific rulings with regard to such 
adjustments will vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there is a remarkable 
consistency in the areas where such adjustments are made. So, for example, it is usually 
recognised that capital expenditure and its associated depreciation charges create problems 
of allowability, consistency and predictability for tax accounting. The replacement of 
depreciation charges with capital allowances is a common response to this difficulty, but 
there will remain other areas where rulings are necessary to overcome similar problems. 
Examples include provisions against both inventory valuation and recoverable debt 
(receivables), as well as provisioning for potential future liabilities and the treatment of assets 
with time-limited worth, such as derivative and hedging contracts. All these are likely to 
require particular accounting rules for tax purposes. The CCCTB provides examples of some 
possible treatments.  
 
Another area where the same potential problem arises is with regard to interest payments. 
Although interest expenses are for financial accounting purposes appropriately considered 
costs incurred during the course of a period, they may also be considered a substitute for 
profit distribution to the owners of equity capital, which are almost invariably not allowed as 
deductions to reduce tax liabilities. These conflicting accounting treatments can therefore 
create tax distortions. Again tax rulings are required, which may entail considerable scope for 
discretion. Exploiting differences in such treatment between national tax authorities is fertile 
ground for tax avoidance, and dealing with this is an important aspect of the OECD’s Action 
Plan on BEPS. 
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Perhaps less commonly appreciated, but nonetheless still within the same category of 
transactions at the interface between the recognition of the capital asset and the revenue 
expense, are payments for the use of patents, copyrights and other intellectual property. 
Payments of this type give rise to taxation difficulties because they fall on the boundary 
between asset recognition and the deduction of allowable expenditure for taxation purposes. 
 
In principle, unitary taxation should apply to the whole of a multinational corporate group, 
defined in terms of a suitable control test and on its consolidated accounts. Financial 
accounting standards already include both control criteria and principles for consolidation, 
and multinationals already produce accounts based on those standards. The issue, as we 
have pointed out in this paper, is what would be the most practical approach to adopt to 
adjust group financial reports to tax accounting standards. The two main systems, the US 
state taxation and the EU’s CCCTB, both apply only to a subset of the corporate group, the 
entities operating within the region concerned. Neither begins from the consolidated financial 
accounts of that subset of entities; instead the financial accounts of each entity are first 
adjusted to the tax accounting standard, and the result is then simply added together or 
aggregated into one total to form the basis of the sum to be apportioned to individual 
jurisdictions. This approach is far from satisfactory. 
 
Probably the main reason for adopting this approach is the desire to remain compatible with 
existing international tax rules. Thus US states which previously applied formulary 
apportionment on the basis of a worldwide combined report were obliged to offer a water’s 
edge election following an international campaign and constitutional challenges (Picciotto 
1992; Siu et al. 2014). The CCCTB seems to have been crafted to operate on this narrower 
basis.  
 
In addition to regional adoption, a limited unitary approach could also be applied to 
multinationals on an activity basis. This possibility has been analysed particularly by Michael 
Durst, who points out that its similarity to the profit split method under current transfer pricing 
rules could make it acceptable without changing existing tax treaties (Durst 2013a). 
However, he also indicates some of its disadvantages, especially the problem of defining the 
particular business activity to be treated separately and creating segmented accounts for it, 
as well as separating investment income from business income. Also, although he suggests 
that an advantage of this approach could be avoiding the need for full-scale ‘book to tax 
income conversion’ (i.e. adjustment of financial accounts to tax standards), in our view he 
understates the drawbacks and limitations of making these adjustments on an ad hoc basis, 
involving a detailed examination of the accounts, which he accepts it entails. 
 
Hence in our view a better approach would be to start from the worldwide consolidated 
financial accounts of the corporate group, and adjust them to the appropriate tax accounting 
standards. This provides a trail from financial accounts representing actual economic activity 
undertaken to tax accounts. In the absence of internationally-agreed tax accounting 
standards this does, however, raise questions on how such adjustments should be made; an 
issue considered briefly by Michael Durst, who also advocates this approach (Durst 2013b). 
One solution he suggests is a move by tax administration towards ‘book-tax conformity’ – 
convergence of tax with financial reporting standards. For the reasons discussed in greater 
detail earlier in the paper, this does not seem either desirable or feasible. Secondly, Durst 
argues that even if national tax administrations require conversion of consolidated financial 
accounts to their own tax standards, the resulting disparities would be no more than what 
already occurs under the current separate entity/arm’s length approach. 
 
Based on the analysis in this paper, we can make a number of suggestions regarding such 
possible convergence or harmonisation of accounting and tax rules. First of all, we believe 
that the EU has laid the foundations of a viable conceptual framework for taxation in the 
proposed CCCTB. Its transaction-based approach to the recognition of revenue and 
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deductible costs is sound, as is its adherence to the principle of only recognising realised 
profits, with the associated capital maintenance concept of maintaining financial capital. 
These are all necessary in a corporate taxation system where capacity to pay is vital if the 
resulting charge to tax is to be considered fair by those asked to pay it. 
 
Secondly, by eschewing many of the problems embedded in financial reporting the EU is 
promoting certainty and predictability, considered to be major principles of taxation (Smith 
1776). 
 
However, perhaps the most important development that the CCCTB has to offer is found in 
the 2013 version put forward as a compromise document by the Irish Presidency (European 
Commission 2013). Within that document a revised Article 12 was presented that offered 
individual jurisdictions the opportunity to present differing approaches to the deductibility of 
payments made to charities. This opens an intriguing possibility that we think worthy of 
further exploration. As we have noted above, due to social settlements, local conflicts and 
histories, there are a range of contentious issues where the interface between tax-
deductibility and capital recognition concepts give rise to significantly differing judgments on 
tax-allowable expenses. On each of these judgments, it is possible that interstate disputes 
might arise when seeking to agree a unitary taxation base. For example, deductibility of 
interest payments and tax relief for royalty payments frequently give rise to disputes, and 
governments may use tax policies to encourage investment. Tax relief for research and 
development and investment in plant and machinery may be connected with macroeconomic 
policies and pursuit of competitive advantage, whilst some others may be routine and non-
controversial (e.g. deduction of rent, travel costs). Thus, international or EU-wide agreement 
on deductibility of some expenses may be easier for some categories of expenditure, whilst 
others may be more protracted.  
 
As a result, for pragmatic reasons we would suggest that deductible expenses included in 
the unitary taxation base should be subdivided. By far the majority in terms of both type and 
value could be agreed by default between the states agreeing to use a unitary taxation base, 
precisely because they are not contentious. The remaining range of expenses (e.g. interest 
payments) could be agreed to be subject to deduction, but in accordance with rules 
determined locally by each participating jurisdiction (which could be EU member states) 
within the unitary taxation base. Such an approach would encourage an acceptance of 
unitary taxation. We suggest that the 2013 draft of the CCCTB might now provide (albeit 
tentatively and only so far with regard to charitable expenditure) a basis for this approach.  
 
On this basis, and with necessary refinement of this proposal being the subject of political 
negotiation, we think it possible that a taxation base for unitary taxation that is broadly, but 
not precisely, equivalent to the accounting concept of EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxation, Depreciation and Amortisation) could be developed. This resulting tax base before 
offset of locally-determined allowances could then be apportioned in accordance with a 
formula that is likely to exclude assets, because relief for expenditure on capital will be given 
locally and capital costs do not therefore need to be considered for formula purposes. This 
approach will have the advantage of removing from contention an area of considerable 
accounting difficulty, which asset valuation always represents. 
 
In that case there remains one further recommendation that we would make. In preparing 
this figure for what we might for shorthand purposes call Taxation EBITDA (although it will 
also exclude items like royalties and research and development expenditure), one of the 
problems that we have already noted with regard to aggregated entity accounting as we 
define it should be overcome. We believe it is essential that the figure for revenue to be used 
for the purposes of this exercise should be prepared on a consolidated basis in the sense 
that is used for financial reporting – that is, a consistent set of accounting standards must be 
applied for the purpose of calculating this one figure, with adjustment being required between 
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each individual jurisdiction to accord with this universally-applied standard. By definition this 
will of course mean that the same standard will apply to intragroup purchases, since that will 
be necessary for the purposes of their elimination from consideration for aggregation 
purposes. This pragmatic approach would mean that all other expenses would not need to 
be consolidated, simplifying the process, but by definition problems of accounting for, and 
arbitraging of, transfer pricing adjustments within the unitary base should be removed from 
consideration using this approach. Dependence upon a GAAR to eliminate abuse would 
therefore be reduced, although we would strongly recommend the retention of such a rule to 
cover other areas of potential exploitation. 
 
This approach can provide a basis for the regional adoption of unitary taxation. Firstly, many 
of the potential obstacles to agreement of that unitary taxation base are eliminated from 
consideration. Secondly, a simple method of aggregation that overcomes most of the 
problems inherent in the CCCTB is proposed with a backstop to prevent abuse being 
retained. Thirdly, those parts of the tax base that are frequently subject to tax competition 
(e.g. rates of capital allowances) would remain under local jurisdictional control. This way 
political subsidiarity is preserved in areas where it is likely to be important.  
 
Of course the proposals here are not a panacea, but do offer the possibility of structured 
negotiations around important issues. Pragmatic solutions based upon fundamental concepts 
important to corporation taxation can be developed from existing thinking; these could be 
significant in tackling taxation abuse in wide geographic areas without the creation of major 
political obstacles to agreement. We believe that the development of tax reporting standards 
would be a significant step, and would encourage further research into that possibility.  
 
How then do these suggestions relate to the need of developing countries for an effective 
mechanism to protect their taxation revenue from multinational corporations, which frequently 
constitutes a significant part of their tax base? We suggest there are three ways in which this 
might be the case. Firstly, the EU’s CCCTB suggests that regional solutions to unitary 
taxation are possible and potentially viable mechanisms for tackling issues of base erosion 
and profit shifting. This would appear to have application in developing countries because 
neighbouring countries are inevitably major trading partners, and so likely to be the subject of 
potential transfer pricing activity. Secondly, we think that the development of common tax 
reporting standards between these nations would reduce the risk of tax competition on these 
issues, and so focus attention on economic fundamentals when issues relating to business 
location might be under consideration. Lastly, and importantly, by combining pragmatism on 
the creation of common tax bases where agreement is likely to be relatively easily secured 
with the recognition of the significance of tax sovereignty to nation states, we suggest that 
the basis of profit apportionment we suggest in the final part of our paper might form the 
basis for a practical way forward in negotiations on this issue.  
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Appendix 
 
Inventory valuation and company profits 
 
The following example illustrates the issues arising from the use of FIFO and LIFO methods 
for valuing inventories. A company converts small widgets to big widgets. During the year it 
made the following purchases: 
 
Lot 1: 2,000 widgets at £3 each = £  6,000 
Lot 2: 1,200 widgets at £4 each = £  4,800 
Lot 3: 1,000 widgets at £5 each =  £  5,000 
Total  4,200     £15,800 
 
It sold 3,000 widgets at £8 each (total sales, £24,000). At the end of the year, the company 
had an inventory of 1,200 widgets. What is its profit? The answer will depend on the cost that 
is assigned to the inventory.  
 
Under FIFO, goods are assumed to be sold in roughly the order in which they are purchased. 
Thus inventory in-hand is to be valued at the most recent prices. These are 1,000 items at £5 
(£5,000) and another 200 at £4 (£800), giving a valuation of closing stock of £5,800. Thus 
the profit (sales – cost of sales (purchases – closing stock)) would be (£24,000 - (15,800 – 
5,800) = £14,000.  
 
Under LIFO, the latest items are assumed to be sold first. Thus inventory in-hand is valued at 
the earliest prices. This is 1,200 items at £3 each, giving a valuation of closing stock of 
£3,600. Thus the profit (sales – cost of sales (purchases – closing stock)) would be (£24,000 
– (15,800 – 3,600) = £11,800. 
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